Rewritten Title: Expert Analysis: Why an F-35 Sale to Saudi Arabia is Unlikely to Reshape Regional Dynamics
Rewritten Article:
A Landmark Announcement
In a high-profile meeting at the White House, former US President Donald Trump announced that the United States is prepared to sell advanced F-35 Lightning II fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. The announcement, made during the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was immediately portrayed in regional and international media as a “major development” with the potential to shift the balance of power.
However, a deeper analysis of US foreign policy history, official statements from Washington, and reports from leading think tanks suggests that, despite the initial fanfare, this deal is unlikely to have a decisive impact on the military equilibrium in West Asia.
The Unwavering Pillar of US Policy
A consistent and fundamental principle of US policy, solidified since 1968 and particularly by a 2008 Congressional act, is a commitment to ensuring that any arms sales to Arab nations do not compromise the Qualitative Military Edge (QME) of Israel. This is not merely a diplomatic assurance but a legal requirement. Every proposed arms package undergoes rigorous assessment by the US Department of Defense and Department of State to ensure compliance.
Following discussions with the new US Secretary of State, Israeli officials have publicly reaffirmed that Washington has provided the necessary guarantees regarding Israel’s continued military superiority. Experts note that such guarantees are typically operationalized in several ways: providing Arab buyers with downgraded versions of the aircraft lacking key electronic warfare and communication systems, restricting access to certain long-range air-to-air missiles, and maintaining software controls that could allow for remote deactivation in extreme scenarios.
While Israel already operates a fleet of over 45 advanced F-35Is (a unique variant with significant customizations), any jets delivered to Saudi Arabia would lack many of these capabilities, and their delivery is not expected until the end of the current decade at the earliest.
A Precedent of Halted Deals: The UAE F-35 Case
Recent history offers a telling precedent. In October 2020, a similar announcement was made regarding the sale of 50 F-35s to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a move also described as a “game-changer.” However, the subsequent US administration effectively suspended and then halted the deal.
Reasons cited at the time included concerns over the UAE’s military cooperation with other global powers and the imperative to uphold Israel’s QME. The UAE ultimately withdrew from the purchase, citing the “stringent technical and operational conditions” imposed by the US. This experience demonstrates that an announcement of an F-35 sale to an Arab nation does not guarantee its full and final delivery, a situation particularly relevant given Saudi Arabia’s own complex international partnerships.
Strategic Control and One-Sided Benefits
US arms policy towards the Gulf states has long been based on a dual foundation: generating substantial revenue for the American defense industry and maintaining strategic control over the purchaser. While Saudi Arabia has spent over $130 billion on US weaponry since 2010, a significant portion of these systems have either never been delivered or came with severe operational restrictions.
The potential F-35 sale follows this pattern. Beyond the direct revenue for the manufacturer, the decades-long dependency on the US for maintenance, updates, and munitions ensures continued strategic and technical leverage for Washington. Crucially, the US never transfers the complete technology; core software remains under the control of the Pentagon, with the possibility of support being severed during sensitive political circumstances.
A November 2025 report from a prominent Western think tank concluded that an F-35 sale to Riyadh would do more to strengthen the US defense industry and maintain Saudi strategic dependency than to revolutionize the Kingdom’s air power.
Operational and Temporal Hurdles
Even under the most optimistic scenarios, Saudi Arabia is not expected to receive operational F-35s before 2030. The manufacturer’s production line is currently saturated, training Saudi pilots will take several years, and any shift in the political composition of the US Congress could further delay or restrict the deal.
Furthermore, a reported assessment from the US Defense Department has warned that Saudi Arabia’s extensive military cooperation with other nations could increase the risk of unauthorized access to the F-35’s sensitive technology. Such concerns could provide a legal basis for imposing additional limitations or even canceling the contract altogether, mirroring the outcome with the UAE.
Conclusion
In summary, while the proposed sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia appears on the surface to be a historic and transformative deal, it is constrained by three fundamental factors: the US’s legal and practical commitment to preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, the precedent of halted or restricted sales to other Arab nations, and the inherently controlled nature of such advanced US defense exports.
The experience of the UAE, the clear statements from US and Israeli officials, and expert analyses all indicate that even if these jets are delivered, they will be a limited and controlled version, unlikely to fundamentally alter the existing regional military balance.